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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CHRISTOPHER and RUTH
CHRISTOPHER,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-vsLARSON FORD SALES, INC., FORD
MARKETING CORPORATION, and
MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND LOAN
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants,
Case No

14063

-vsLARSON FORD SALES, INC.,
Defendant-Third Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vsCONDOR COACH CORPORATION,
Third Party Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Complaint of the plaintiff is based upon fraud and
breach of warranty for a particular use regarding the purchase

of a 1970 Condor motor home by the plaintiffs from the defendant,
Larson Ford, a motor vehicle dealer, and Ford Marketing Company,
the manufacturer of the chassis of said motor home.

Larson

Ford made a Third Party Claim based on breach of warranty over
the third party defendant, Condor Coach Corporation, who
manufactured the body upon the Ford Chassis and installed
various component parts in the body to allow persons to live
and eat in the motor home*
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, sitting with a jury, denied a Motion
to Dismiss of the defendant, Larson Ford, and granted a Motion
to Dismiss of the defendant, Ford Marketing Company, at the end
of plaintiffs' evidence, denied a Motion for a Directed Verdict
on the part of the defendant, Larson Ford, and granted a Motion
to Dismiss defendant's Third Party Complaint by the defendant,
Condor Coach Corporation, allowed the case of the plaintiffs
against Larson Ford to go to the jury on the theories of breach
of warranty merchantibility and fraud, upon which the jury
found in a general verdict that the plaintiffs were entitled
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to rescind the contract and awarded a Judgment for out-ofpocket damages.

The trial court also denied a Motion for a

New Trial on the defendant's Crossclaim against Condor Coach
Corporation, and denied a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
Verdict as to the jury verdict returned against Larson Ford.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant, Larson Ford, seeks to reverse the trial
court's various denials of Motions to Dismiss the plaintiffs'
Complaint, and the denial of the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict of Larson Ford to enter a Judgment of No Cause of
Action; or in the alternative, to enter a Judgment against
Condor Coach Corporation pursuant to the Third Party Claim,
or to Order a new trial upon all of the issues in this case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs herein filed a Complaint alleging, among
other matters, that the defendants had made the following
representations to the plaintiffs:
"(a) That the Condor was a new machine which
had been driven only 7,000 miles. In truth and in
fact, said machine was a used machine which had been
in service for many months and which plaintiffs believe
and therefore allege had been driven more than 60,000
miles when they purchased it, and this fact was well
known to both Larson Ford Sales, Inc. and Ford
Marketing Corporation.
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(b) That the condor Motor Home was reasonably fit
for the purposes which plaintiffs revealed to Larson
Ford Sales, Inc. they intended to put said vehicle,
namely for the purpose of transporting people in the
Intermountain West where there are numerous steep
highways, over mountains, and in addition for the
purpose of towing a motor car to be used when the
motor home was parked. In truth and in fact, said
statement and representation was completely false in
that the motor home itself would not reasonably pass
over and climb through the mountain roads located in
the area where plaintiffs live and the sale was made,
but did not have sufficient power and/or drive train
strength to carry the motor home itself, let alone
tow a motor car.
(c) That the Condor Motor Home was reasonably fit
for the purpose intended, namely use by plaintiff and
his wife or their family in traveling around over the
Intermountain West. In truth and in fact, the motor
home's motor and drive train were of insufficient
capacity to carry without damage the weight of the
motor home and propel the same over the mountain
roads in and about Utah and in the Intermountain West
where all parties knew plaintiffs intended it to be
driven.
(d) Defendants Larson Ford Sales, Inc. and Ford
Marketing Corporation warranted the Condor 27 foot
Motor Home particularly described to be designed,
equipped and reasonably fit for the purpose intended,
namely for travel when fully occupied over the
highways of the state of Utah and the Intermountain
West. Contrary to said warranty, when put to the
test of operation, said motor vehicle revealed that
it was inadequately powered, that the drive train
was insufficient to handle the weight and size of
the motor home when used in the usual and ordinary
course of plaintiff's travel over the highways of
the state of Utah and the Intermountain West, and
contrary to said warranty, the motor would not and
could not be used with reasonable safety and without
extraordinary and unusual damage'to the same in Utah,
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Nevada, California and other areas where the defendants
would normally expect plaintiff to use said motor
vehicle.
(e) Defendants Larson Ford Sales, Inc. and Ford
Marketing Corporation, through Larson Ford Sales, Inc.
represented to the plaintiffs that the Condor Motor
Home was in a reasonably fit condition and could be
reasonably used without excessive charges for repair
in the Intermountain West, and represented that said
vehicle has a reasonable amount of trouble-free use
remaining in its useful life, when in truth and in fact
said motor vehicle was worn out or so defective, as was
well known to both Larson Ford Sales, Inc. and Ford
Marketing Corporation, that it could not be used at
all without excessive wear and without requiring its
owner to pay substantial amounts in excess of what
would be reasonable to maintain the vehicle in a
reasonably good working condition."
(R. 370 and 371)
The prayer of plaintiffs' Complaint requests the sum of
$14,225.00 and $1,500.00 general damages for repairs, a further
sum of $5,000.00 general damages, or for rescission of the
contract, and $6,500.00 general damages.
After pre-trial discovery, a plenary trial was had.
The facts as they appear from the record are as follows:
The plaintiff, John Christopher, and his son, Robin,
had been looking for a motor home for several days, had looked
at various brands of motor homes (R. 443, L. 2-4), and saw the
subject unit on May 9, 1972, while driving by Larson Ford and
stopped to look at this unit (R. 395 and 396). At that time,
the Christophers had a conversation with Jon Larson, a salesman
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working for Larson Ford, telling Mr. Larson that they needed
a unit which would have room for ten boys and pull another
machine or car, and were assured by Mr. Larson that it would,
and further, Larson told Christopher the name of a man who
had a Condor which was an identical unit, who pulled a big
horse trailer with four horses in it and had no problem.
Christopher didn't talk to this person (R. 397, L. 22-28).
Christopher, at this time, also noted the subject unit had
over 7,000 miles on it, and in response to this, was told
by Larson that the unit was a demonstrator and had a new
motor in it, because the original motor had "blown up" at
Bakersfield, California (R. 390, L. 6-14).
Robin #

After that, •'.

the son, looked around for other motor homes, and had

looked at another motor home, but the price was $21,000.00
to $23,000.00 (R. 557), and the plaintiff told Robin to
make Larson an offer less than the asking price to "feel
him (Larson) out" (R. 399, L. 9^?23) . At no time had either
Robin or his father taken demonstration rides in any other
motor homes to see how they performed (R. 557 and 558), nor
was there any testimony adduced by the plaintiff as to how
other motor homes performed.
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Financing was arranged through Murray First Thrift and
Exhibit 4-P, a vehicle buyer's order, 9-P, a conditional sales
contract, and 11-P (R. 431 and 432) were signed by the plaintiff
on May 13, 1972, as documents of sale.
Paragraph 17 of Exhibit 9-P provides ,as follows:

I
Y
;

,

"No representation, promise or warranty,
^
express or implied has been made with
respect to the merchantability, suitability .
or fitness for purpose of the Property
or otherwise unless the same is endorsed . ;
hereon in writing or is contained in a
separate written instrument signed by
the original Seller.11

,.
:

Christopher first drove the vehicle on May 18th or 19th (R. 406,
L. 23). It did not have a trailer hitch on it (R. 444), and
after Robin Christopher purchased a trailer hitch (R. 504) and
mounted the same upon the motor home with the help of personnel
from Larson Ford (R. 444, L. 21-27 and 504, L. 11-17), the
plaintiff and his son drove the vehicle, towing a van owned by
Robin, up Parley's Canyon and return.

Thereafter, Christopher

made the final payment of $975.00 upon the contract and Jon
Larson issued Exhibit 3-P, which gave the plaintiffs the balance
of the Ford Warranty on the unit.

Neither the plaintiff nor his

son determined the weight of the Condor, the van, or the load
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either carried, nor did they insist on any test drive of the
vehicle before the plaintiffs signed Exhibits 4-P, 9-P and
11-P. ••• •.-•••' •

• •• -

''.-•••-

v

- . V .

Thereafter, Robin Christopher, 18-year-old son of the
plaintiffs, left Salt Lake City, with the motor home loaded
with eight mentally retarded patients of the American Fork
Training School who weighed about 140 poiinds each (R. 519),
their luggage and towing a Ford Econoline Van loaded with
merchandise for San Jose, California, intending to make such
a trip in one day (R. 518, L. 25), a distance of 780 miles
(R. 549) e

In fact, he made it beyond Reno, Nevada, to a point

some 50 to 70 miles into California the first day.
On this trip and travels after that, Robin claimed that
the unit would pull down to five miles per hour on hills although
it ran at speeds of 50 to 60 miles per hour on level and downhill
stretches (R. 518 and 519), the generator which ran the internal
electrical system wouldn't support electrical cooking units so
Christopher cooked on a gas stove in the unit (R. 520), although
a repairman in Oregon operated the generator easily (R. 524).
Some times, Robin would have to wiggle the shifting lever to
get the starter to engage (R. 522). At one point in Seattle,
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Washington, the motor home with ten boys, their baggage, food
and merchandise, and the van on behind, would not pull up a
hill and Robin had to have one of the boys get in the van and
help the motor home over the hill.

On the way back from ,

Seattle to Sacramento, California, the automatic transmission
would occasionally shift by itself from third gear to second
gear while going downhill (R. 530). During this time, the _,
motor home was never taken to a Ford dealer for any adjustments
pursuant to Exhibit 3-P, but was driven to Sacramento, whereupon
Robin loaded all of the boys into his van and drove to Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Robin and his father went to Larson Ford

and told Jon Larson about these various problems and were
told to bring the motor home back to Salt Lake City and Larson
would repair any problems on it (R. 533). Robin then returned
to Sacramento and drove the unit as far as Reno, Nevada, where
it would not start, for an unknown reason, whereupon Robin
took a bus back to Salt Lake City, Utah.

Larson Ford arranged

for the unit to be taken to a Ford dealer in Reno and the

.,

transmission was repaired under a warranty of Ford Marketing
Company and now works satisfactorily (R. 565). The plaintiff,
after driving the motor home back to Salt Lake City, came into
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Larson Ford and insisted that Larson take the unit back and

:

refund his money (R. 428 and 429) .
The plaintiff then took the motor home to a Mr. William
W. Haslam, a bus mechanic, who testified that the solenoid
which operates the starting system on the motor of the unit
was mounted on the frame three-to-three~and-one-half inches
from the exhaust manifold and the heat from the exhaust

.

manifold caused a breakdown in the wiring inside the solenoid
and caused failure of the starting system which could be cured
by moving the solenoid further from the manifold

(R, 610), and

further that the fuel supply line for the motor which, runs .
an auxiliary generator was installed cross-threaded, causing
the motor to receive air rather than fuel through the fuel
line (R- 611), which was cured by properly tightening the
lines, then found that the fuel line was too short to pick -. .
up the fuel when the fuel level was below one-half of a tank
(R. 612 and 613)• .Further, it was Haslam's opinion, admitted
over objections by all of the defendants as to lack of
qualification of the witness and improper foundation, that
the power train design was too small for the load it was to
carry, and further that when Haslam turned the air cleaner
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cover on the motor over, the motor was better able to handle
the load, and further, it was Haslam's opinion that the air
supply to the engine was restricted because of design (R. 621
and 622), and further that a howl in the driveline complained
of by Christopher was a result of a mismatch of gears and
further, that the motor, transmission driveline and differential
were too small to handle this particular size of motor home
(R. 624). However, the motor had adequate compression according
to Haslam's tests (R. 638 and 639),
An expert with respect to the ability of a given chassis
to climb a given grade with a load was called by the defendant,
Larson Ford, Donald F. Lee, testified that various factors,
influenced the ability of any automobile or truck to climb a
hill, but that the absolute maximum speed that the particular
chassis in the plaintiffs' vehicle could attain going up a six
percent (6%) grade with a gross combined vehicle weight of
19,200 pounds would be 12 miles per hour (R. 836) with the wind,
temperature conditions and air pressure all operating to lower
this speed (R. 841).
The unit in question was manufactured by Condor and
purchased by Larson as an authorized Condor Coach dealer from
Condor Coach Corporation on August 5, 1970.

Exhibit 25-DC which

was contained in a large operator's manual which was presumably
in a drawer within the motor home for which Larson Ford signed

a receipt, exhibit 24-DC (P. 857). Exhibit 25-DC, entitled
"Warranty" provided that in order for it to be in effect the
Condor Coach be purchased from or delivered through an authorized
Condor Coach dealer and provided that the Condor Coach body
and the installation of component parts were warranted to be
free from, any substantial defects for twelve (12) months after
the date of delivery to such purchaser or until it was dirven
12,000 miles, whichever occurs first.

There were no documents

of sale between Condor and Larson Ford as it was a cash transaction,
Because of a defect in the interior panelling, the unit
was driven back to El Monte, California, and the interior was
replaced by Condor under its warranty, then on the way back from
El Monte, California, the engine failed (R. 860) and was replaced
under the Ford warranty (R. 861). The vehicle was returned to
Salt Lake City, Utah, by Park Larson and sat on Larson's lot
until the Christophers purchased the vehicle in May of 1972.
There was no evidence of any changes made mechanically in the
motor home during the time that Larson Ford had it, except the
replacement of the motor under the Ford warranty.
At the time that Larson Ford was sued by the Christophers
in this matter, Park Larson, the president of Larson Ford
contacted Condor and informed them of the lawsuit (R. 861 and
862), and also there was a conversation after the lawsuit began
with Condor's personnel regarding the nature of the claim (R. 865).

It was stipulated between Larson and Condor that the
evidence of the Christophers of breach of warranty could be
considered as evidence of breach of warranty alleged by Larson
against Condor (R. 868 and 869). However, with respect to
those defects, Condor's president, Mr. Kieffer, testified
that if the solenoid was mounted too close to the exhaust
manifold on this unit and such a location caused solenoid
failure, that he would have had 400 other claims (R. 890)
and that a certain amount of drive line howl is usual, and
if it is abnormal it could be repaired, also that the odometer
for the generator on the unit showed that the generator which
Christopher claimed would not run showed that the generator
had run 352 hours (R. 893). Further, Mr. Kieffer

testified that

this particular unit, if it were not abused could and would
pull a 4000 pound trailer (R. 898) and that he personally pulls
a jeep behind his own Condor motor home to the mountains of
Colorado (R.879).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE
OF MERCHANTIBILITY TO THE JURY.
A.

Submitting the issue of merchantibility to the jury

violated the right of the defendant Larson to be advised of
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the nature of the claim made by the plaintiff.
The Complaint of the plaintiff does not mention the
word merchantibility in any respect, yet the trial court submitted
the issue of merchantibility to the jury by instruction number
12 to which objection was made by counsel for Larson Ford at
page 375, L. 30 and page 376 of the exceptions to jury instructions.

No Motion to Amend the Complaint was made by the plaintiff

or granted by the Court.
In Buehner Block Co. v. Nick Glezos, 6 U2d 226, 310 P2
517 (1957), the Court held that an adverse party is to be
given the benefit of every doubt and not to have been misled
nor in any way prejudiced by the introduction

of new issues.

Merris v. Russell, 120 U 545, 236 P2d 459 (

) , and National

Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 U2d 713,
286 P2d 249, completely support this holding going on to recount
the efforts ;to eliminate technicalities and liberalize procedures,
but never to the extent that we lose sight of one of the cardinal
principals of due process of law - to allow a party to have
notice of the issues and an opportunity to meet them before
his rights with respect to them are concluded.

In Cheney v.

Ruckes, 14 U2d 205, 389 P2d 86 (1963), the Court stated that
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in order to safeguard the rights of the other party, he must
have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests.
The defendant, Larson Ford Sales, did object to the amendment
and were caught unaware as to the issue of merchantability as
to the plaintiffs' claim.

On P. 911, L. 1-4, of the transcript

of trial (4th day) counsel for defense declared his position:
"I didn't come into Court prepared to deal
with merchantability and I don't have any
instructions with respect to merchantability
because it was never set forth in the Complaint."
Therefore, the Court was fully aware of his surprise and his
feeling a disadvantage at permitting the new issue to become
part of the Complaint.

Further, in Pacific Marine Schwabacher,

Inc. v. Hvdroswift Corp.,

U2d

_,

525 P2d 615 (1974) ,

an amendment allowing merchantability was presented to the
Court and would have been refused, but for the words in the
original Complaint alleging the goods concerned in the case
in "no way salable.11

The words themselves raise the issue of

merchantability, the Court citing 3 Benders UCC Services, sec. 7
at (3), defined the standard of merchantability as to be
honestly resalable in the normal course of business.

Read in

conjunction with U.C.A. 70A-2-316 (2), which requires any disclaimer
of merchantability to mention merchantability and in case of
writing to be conspicuous, a development of the law has focused
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itself toward the clarifying of any issue concerning merchantability so as to make all parties concerned aware of such an
issue.

The defendant in this case was not made aware of this

issue by any specific wording in the Complaint.

There was no

mention as to the merchantability or salability of the motor
home nor a reference as to its failure to meet the standard
set by other motor homes on the market being sold daily.
It was error for the court to violate the rights
of Larson Ford to a fair trial by allowing the issue of
merchantability to be submitted to the jury when the wording
of the Complaint and all other proceedings in this matter
indicated that a claim of warranty of fitness for a particular
use and fraud only were being made.
B.

,•..-.' .......

The warranty of merchantability was disclaimed by

the documents of sale signed by the plaintiff.
The trial court properly ruled that the plaintiffs1
claim for breach of warranty for fitness for a particular use
was properly disclaimed by the documents of sale (R. 720 and
721), but allowed the claim of merchantability to go to the
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jury.

Exhibit 4-P signed by the plaintiff included an exclusion

as to implied warranties in larger type and of a darker print
than the balance of the contract. As to new vehicles in
paragraph 6 below the word conditions, the current printed
warranty as to that vehicle was in lieu of, "any implied warranty
of merchantibility or fitness for a particular use."

As to used

vehicles in the same paragraph, "no warranties express or implied,
are made by the dealer with respect to used motor vehicles
furnished hereunder except as may be expressed in writing by
/the dealer for such used vehicle, which, if so expressed is
incorporated herein."

On the same day, the plaintiffs signed

the retail sales contract, Exhibit 9-P, which being signed by
both seller and buyer was incorporated to complete the sales
agreement.

Exhibit 9-P contained the above mentioned disclaimer

.in paragraph 17.
"No representation, promise or warranty,
express or implied has been made with
respect to the merchantibility, suitability
or fitness for purpose of the Property
or otherwise unless the same is endorsed
•--'" hereon in writing or is contained in a
separate written instrument signed by
the original Seller."
In Landes and Co. v. Fellows, 81 U 432, 19 P2d 89 (1933), a
used harvestor was purchased subject to an order and a sales
contract.

The order did not include a disclaimer of implied
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warranties, but the sales contract contained such an exclusion.
The Courts held that since the sales contract and the order
covered the same subject matter, the sales contract merged and
superceded all prior oral and written contracts concerning that
purchase and therefore excluded all evidence as to breach of
warranty*

Further, that where goods are sold on inspection, as

in the instant case, there is no standard but identity and no
implied warranty other than that identical goods should be
delivered.

Since the conditional sales contract contained the

disclaimer in writing by the terms of the order, the disclaimer
was incorporated into the order. Also, the sales contract
merged and superceded the order according to the holding in
Landes and Co., and therefore the disclaimer applicable to this
purchase was contained in the sales contract and excluded any
implied warranty of merchantibility.

In the case of Redmond v.

Petty Motor Co., 121 U 32, 242 P2d 302 (1952), the trial court
refused to submit a claim of warranty of merchantibility to the
jury and the Utah Supreme Court, on appeal held that where a
written contract had a disclaimer of expressed or implied
warranties and there was no evidence that plaintiff did not read
the agreement, the breach of an implied warranty of merchantibility
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could not be submitted to the jury.

The evidence fails to show

that the plaintiff, John Christopher, did other than sign the
contract.

There is no testimony as to his failure to read the

contract before signing. .Further, in Tibbets v, Openshaw,
18 U2d 442, 425 P2d 160 (1967), the Court ruled that where homes
were sold, "as is,1' which were allegedly not constructed in a
good and workmanlike manner and not in accord with local building
codes, the contract stands as the agreement between the parties.
The Court cited U.C.A. 70A-2-316 (3), "Unless circumstances
indicate otherwise all implied warranties are excluded by
expressions like, 'as is,1 'with.all faults,f or other language
which in common understanding makes it plain there is no implied
warranties."

In the purchase of goods between the parties herein,

the exclusion of any implied warranties not included in the contract was made in both agreements signed by the plaintiff.
Both were in larger and darker print, conspicuously using the
words excluding such warranties.

70A-2-316 (2) requires the

mention of merchantibility in a conspicuous manner.

Both

agreements mention merchantibility; and the conditional sales
contract applies the term narrowly and without any doubt to
the vehicle purchased by the plaintiffs.
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In another jurisdiction, such a disclaimer as to merchantibility was held to waive any subsequent issue concerning a
breach of such a warranty.

See Childers and Venters, Inc. v.

Soward, 460 SW2d 343 (Ky 1970).

Thus, in this sale, there was

no warranty of merchantibility, and therefore the motion to .
dismiss the claims of the plaintiff should have been granted,
or the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should
have been granted,

. _
.-: POINT II. •'

\

J' •

. . .,:. . . \

THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES AS TO THE MOTOR HOME WAS NEVER
BREACHED BY DEFENDANT, LARSON FORD SALES, INC, .. ,
The only written document giving any warranty upon the
vehicle was Exhibit 3-P, a letter given by Jon Larson in lieu
of the Ford Service Warranty Card by the following words in
said exhibit:

>

.

'..- •

;•. . •...

"This unit is fully covered under Ford's
service warranty and at time of delivery,
we were unable to furnish his Warranty .
Card."
Such wording could n o t give the Christophers any greater
warranty than whatever w a s provided in Ford Motor Company's
service warranty, which w a s never proved at trial.

However,

mechanical repair service w a s never denied the Christophers
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when they sought mechanical repair from a Ford dealer.

Pursuant

to this letter, the Christophers had the transmission repaired
in Reno, Nevada, shortly before they attempted to rescind this
transaction with Larson Ford Sales.

In Vernon v. Lake Motors,

26 U2d 269, 488 P2d 302 (1971), a fire originating under the
dashboard caused.the new vehicle to be ruined en route to the
dealer from; whom the vehicle was purchased.

The plaintiff

previous to the damage noticed the smoke, inquired with a local
dealer, and then proceeded to return it for repair.

The Court

refused to allow plaintiff damages under breach of warranty if
if could be shown she knew of the defect and possible danger.
The plaintiff, John Christopher, complained of the lack of
power in this vehicle after his first trip up, Parley l s Canyon
as evidenced in the transcript of the trial.

However, the

v

plaintiff continued possession of the vehicle and,, in fact,
took the vehicle on his trip to California.

He gave no notice

of a breach of warranty at that time, nor ur>til the unit.had
been driven from Salt Lake City, Utah, ~ to San Jose, California,
then to Seattle, Washington, and back to Sacramento, California.
The plaintiff's duty was to give such a notice at the time of
discovery or take the risk of any subsequent damage resulting
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from the same defect of which he complained.

There being no

other warranties given with this particular sale, the action
for breach of warranty must fail

in accordance with the

holdings of the foregoing cases.
POINT III. •
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1
WARRANTY CLAIM DUE TO THE PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO
MEET STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.

;

-

The plaintiff failed to notify the defendant of the breach
of warranty and subsequently returned the unit to the defendant
demanding his money back, plaintiff must meet the requirements
of U.C.A. 70A-2-608, entitled, Revocation of Acceptance, in
turn giving defendant the right to cure under U.C.A. 7QA-2-508.
The purpose of these sections of the U.C.A. is to allow the
seller a chance to conform the goods to the buyer's demands ;
before allowing the buyer to rescind a contract to which he
* agreed.

The defendant, Larson Ford, was at all times willing

and able to cure the problems with the vehiclec

The vehicle

did make the trip to California and after repairs returned.
The problems which arose on the trip could be cured, and
the right to cure any non-conformity should have been granted
the defendant before the plaintiff was allowed to rescind
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his contract under U.C.A. 70A-2-711. Without .meeting such
requirements of notice and right to cure, the plaintiff is
limited in U.C.A. 70A-2-714 to recover for a breach of warranty
only the difference between the value of the goods as .represented
and the actual value of the goods when the purchase was made.
No evidence was adduced at the trial to show such a difference
in value. - Thus, if a breach of a warranty could be found, the
damages lie in awarding a benefit of the bargain and not in
rescinding the contract and awarding the contract price to the
plaintiff.

Since no evidence was received by the Court on -

this issue plaintiffs1 claim for warranty should have been dismissed.

- - ,-
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a»

: y - T O THE MOTOR HOME. . ;

.,,
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.;.:;:. -,^

•< Absolutely, no evidence showed that the performance ofthe motor home was not of merchantable quality as compared to
other motor homes on the market.

The only witness appearing

for the plaintiffs was Mr. Haslam, who, while he had extensive
experience with school buses, was not aware in any way of the
way motor homes having automatic transmissions would or should
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perform.

There was no evidence of what was considered a

"merchantable quality" as to the motor home, or as to the
performance of other motor homes.

In Pacific Marine

Schwabacher, supra, the Court announced that the standard of
merchantability of goods was to be such as to be resalable in
the normal course of business and at least fit for the
ordinary purposes, for which such goods are used.

The plaintiffs

allege that the power train coupled with the motor.was not
capable of pulling the motor home adequately over the roads - .,
of the intermountain region.

The president of Condor at

P, 880 stated that over. 2000 such motor homes of equivalent .
specifications are on the road today.

Several drivers of the

Condor motor home have testified as to the capabilities of
that particular unit over, a given road of.various surfaces
and gradients.

This particular vehicle went to California

and back and: :was driven recently, over. Parley.1 s- Summit at
18 miles per. hour according to plaintiffs' witnesses and 25
miles per hour according to defendant's. witnesses.. No comparisons were made by plaintiffs between the motor home in question
and other similar motor homes to establish a failure to conform
with the standard of merchantability as to such vehicles.

In

Haves Merchandise, Inc. v. Dewey, 474 P2d 27 (Wash 1970), a
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standard for determining substantial impairment of value to
the buyer was "To be based on an objective factual evaluation
of the buyer's particular circumstances rather than upon a
subjective test of whether the buyer believed that the value
was substantially impaired (at 273)."

The evidence which

appears in this case does not show that the motor home was
not merchantable, but that the vehicle failed to meet this
particular buyer's expectations which were not shown to be
on a par with the reasonable expectations of such a vehicle.
A California court in Basta v. Riviello, 66 Lach Jun 77
(Lacauanna County Court, Pa 1964), would not apply an implied
warranty of merchantability if an automobile is reasonably
fit for the general purpose for which it was sold.

Tracy v.

Vinton Motors, 130 Vt. 512, 296 A2d 269 (1972), applied such
a warranty only to the operative essentials of a new car as
suited for the ordinary purposes for which the car was manufactured.

The evidence did not attempt to show that the vehicle

purchased by the plaintiffs failed to meet the standards of
salability of motor homes as to their ordinary use and thus
failed to prove a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.
(Without such a standard, how can any person say that it is
or is not unmerchantable?)

Thus, the Court erred in submitting
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the issue of merchantability to the jury because such a claim
was never made by plaintiffs, such a claim was properly disclaimed by the vehicle buyer's order and conditional sales
contract signed by plaintiffs and no standard of merchantability
as to the motor home was proved, thus no breach by the defendant
Larson Ford of such a standard was proved.

The Motions for

Dismissal, for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict as to this claim should have been granted.
POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CLAIM OF FRAUD
TO THE JURY SINCE THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE"
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. " "
The only remaining claim of the piaintiff is that of
fraud committed*

The elements of fraud are:

1.

A statement of fact

2.

The falsity of said statement

3.

The facts stated were material

4.

The person who made the statements knew that they
were false

5.

The person making the statements intended that the
plaintiff would rely upon said statements

6.

The plaintiff's ignorance of the falsity of said fact
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7.

The plaintiff's reasonable reliance upon the truth
of the matters stated

The elements must each be proved by clear and convincing evidence
(Oberg v. Sanders, 111 U 507, 184 P2d 229).
A.

The first requirement of fraud is that a statement

of fact be made.

The statements made by Larson were statements

that others had successfully pulled trailers behind their
Condors.

There is no mention as to where they pulled them,

how fast they pulled them, over what grades they pulled them,
or any other, concrete terms which the Utah Supreme Court has
regarded as being a statement of fact or warranty.. . Examples:
,
:__,

1. .Chicken feed was equal to or superior to any

feed method then in use, chickens would not moult for
15 months, time.effort would be saved, feed would be
less expensive, were not statements of fact, but were
puffing;., although;, a statement that the feed would
.increase egg production by 65% was a statement of fact
sufficient to be a. warranty Park v. Moorman, 121 U2d 339,

. .,.,

241 P2d 914 (1952) .
2.

. .......

r

, _ . _ . r ," .

Stoves would sell like hotcakes, were far superior

to ordinary ranges for cooking and baking, best and finest
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on the market, and were of first class quality, were
all puffing, and as a matter of law, not statements
• of warranty Detroit Vapor Stove v. Wheeler, 61 U 503/"
215 P2d 995, ALR 2nd 632 (1923) ."

-

- :__;.:.-.

3.' Statements by equipment manufacturer's representatives that a contractor, ncould build these buildings
-• and finance-them and there was nothing to worry about,"
where said representative had arranged the meeting with
• the contractor, and subsequently when asked by the
building owner whether to advance" a loan to the contractor, was told by the representatives, " He thought
*" ' that it was all right, but to protect myself," as a
"matter of law were not statements of fact upon which
• fraud could be" based.

Jairdine v. Brunswick Corp.,

18 U2d 378, 423 P2d 659 (1967).

*

- •--. •' 4;: Vases purchased by defendant1 at a price he
""determined as an expert appraiser from the plaintiff
who had little knowledge concerning the value of such
vases, was not viewed as a fact upon which fraud could
"be based when another expert testified to a much
greater valuation.

Thomas v. Caldwell, 27 U2d 423,

497 P2d 31 (1972).
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B.

The second requirement of fraud is that the statement

must be false.

There was never any showing in the record that

any statement Larson made was false. When asked what Larson
actually said to him on that occasion, Christopher stated at
page 2, line 1:
"He said it would easily pull a trailer; that ,
they had on other instances, and he specified
one and told us the man's name who had a • -/ ;
Condor and it was identical . . ."
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that this statement
of fact was false and no attempt was made to prove any of these
facts false, so far as the record appears, everything which
Larson told Christopher was true. A prime example of such a
case is CIT v. Sohm, 15 U2d 262, 391 P2d 293, wherein the trial
court found fraud in certain statements made by a seller of
microwave ovens and the Supreme Court reversed such a finding,
holding that where the plaintiff sued in fraud alleging that
the defendant represented that a microwave oven was useable for
all general home purposes except for frying pancakes, and in
fact, the oven would not fry eggs, bake cakes or bread, cook
cereals, and can fruit, where the plaintiffs sought out the
defendant, and the demonstrator for defendant as well as the
defendant denied making any misleading statements and the only
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evidence of the alleged misleading statements of defendant
was testimony of plaintiffs, that the Supreme Court would
review the facts as well as the law, and reversed the trial
court, essentially saying that where defendant's demonstrator
and defendant stated only what the manufacturer said, there
was no showing that they knew or should have known that the
statements-they made were false, that there was not clear and
convincing evidence of fraud required by Utah law.

In Auerbach v.

Samuels, 10 U2d 152, 349 P2 1112 (1960), the executrix of an
estate told the plaintiffs prior to the decree that there
wasn't enough money to go around as to their legacy and subsequently failed to notify them that it depended on when the
valuation of the estate was made, before or after taxes.

The

courts held that even where such a fiduciary relationship
exists if the plaintiffs had the opportunity and knowledge
to pursue the issue at the time, a charge of fraud could not
be raised.

Again, the evidence was not clear and convincing

that the statement was false.
C.

The fourth requirement of fraud is that the plaintiff

must show that the person who made the statements knew that
they were false. No such showing was attempted in the record,
to the contrary, each of the persons, other than Robin
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Christopher, who had operated this particular vehicle testified
at the trial that no mechanical problems with the vehicle were
encountered by them with the exception of a motor failure at
Bakersfield, California, of which the Christophers were well
aware.

Further, the owner of Condor Coach Company testified

that the Condor would successfully pull a vehicle behind it,
and that he drove a unit similar to that of defendants1 from
Los Angeles, California, into the Colorado Rockies pulling a
jeep behind it.

Further, the Court in Ellis v. Hale, 13 U2d 279,

373 P2d 382 (1962), held that a distinction must be drawn
between negligent and intentional fraud.

In this case, even"

'where a seller of a subdivision plat failed to disclose to the
buyer that the plat was not recorded or approved, the Court
held that no specific duty of care runs between the parties
even if a false statement was made by the seller without
reasonable diligence in verifying his representations if the
parties are dealing at arm's length.

Therefore, no duty was

upon the defendant, Larson Ford, to even verify his representation if he believed them true.

The facts show he did believe

the vehicle would perform as he stated.
D.

The fifth requirement of fraud requires that the

person making the statements intended that the plaintiff would
rely upon such statements.

The defendant disclosed to the

plaintiff the names of other persons in the area who used the
motor homes in a similar manner as the plaintiff intended.

The

defendant gave such names in order that the plaintiff would
not rely solely upon his representations.

Again, in Ellis v.

Hale, supra, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove
the defendant made the/representations with the intention that
the plaintiff so rely.

The Court supported this finding on

the basis of the plaintiff's ability to ask a simple question
to verify the defendant's statements, and,his failure to do so.
In a like manner, Mr. Christopher could have discovered further
information

E.

on which

to rely.

.*•-.••••;-r-.T..; - -/.^ '••••-:-~. ~ •.;•-? '.-•.,-•/•..

•... , •;

The seventh element of fraud is that the-plaintiff's

reasonable reliance upon the truth of the matters stated must
be shown.

Both Robin and John Christopher admitted that they

drove the vehicle along with Jon Larson prior to executing the
documents of sale.

No' vehicle was attached because the trailer

hitch which the ^Christophers were to obtain and?, install was. ..not installed at that time.

In any event, the vehicle was

there to be driven, and its performance could be evaluated
by the Christophers to compare with any statements made by
Larson, also the name of another Condor owner, who pulled a
trailer, was given to the Christophers, but they didn f t
bother to seek him out.
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An interesting case in this regard is that of Slaughter v.
Gerson, 13 Wall, (U.S.) 379, 20 L.Ed. 627, 61 ALR 495 (1872),
where a seller of a steamboat told the buyer that the draft of
the steamboat was shallow enough to navigate a particular
river where the buyer intended to run the boat, and the buyer
could have ascertained this fact but didn't, the buyer was ...
held as a matter of law not to have relied upon the seller's
statements as required in fraud cases.

Utah followed this

rule in the leading case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 U 141, -

-^

247 P2d 273, 54 ALR2d 667 (1952), the trial court found that
fraud had been perpetrated in the sale of bottom land where
the representation had been made by the seller that it was
cultivable.

The buyer- actually looked at the land, and by his

own investigation, could have ascertained whether it-was .
cultivable or not, but didn't.

The Supreme Court, for this

reason, reversed the finding of fraud and the damages awarded
with respect to this land.

Certainly, in the instant case, the

Christophers were in a position to see the vehicle, evaluate
its performance, and speak to others regarding their experience
with pulling vehicles behind the unit, the fact that they did
not do these things properly does not now give them any reason
in law, to void a contract as they seek to do here.

-33-

In Lewis v. White, 2 U2d 101, 269 P2d 865 (1954), the
Court imposed upon the plaintiffs a duty to investigate no
matter how naive or inexperienced they were in order for them
to reasonably rely upon the seller. A similar duty in Auerbach v.
Samuels, supra, was required even where a fiduciary duty ran
between the parties.

There is no reason to place a higher

standard of duty upon the defendant, Larson Ford, who was
dealing at arm's length with the plaintiff, than in such cases
as these.
. F.

Fraud was not shown.
The final and most demanding element of a fraud

case is that it is to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
A review of the evidence of each of the elements referred to
hereinabove shows that no such evidence was adduced at the
trial.

In CIT v. Sohm, supra, this Court reviewed the require-

ments of the clear and convincing evidence rule, and found the
evidence in that case to be wanting in that regard and reversed
the trial court's finding of fraud as a matter of law.

This

was done despite the fact that the buyer's evidence, consisting
of oral testimony, was that the defendant told them that the
oven was useable for all general home purposes except frying
pancakes, and this was disputed by the seller, his demonstrator
and the manufacturer's literature, the buyer had not presented
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clear and convincing evidence of any fraud.

In Lewis v.

White, supra, the deliberate reference to an income exceeding
the truth by $77 5.00 by sellers of a hotel to an elderly lady
was not a convincing show of fraud by the defendants.

The

evidence in the instant case fails to show by clear and convincing evidence that any statement of fact was made, that any
statements made were false, that Larson knew or should have
known that they were false, that Larson intended that the
plaintiffs rely upon those statements, or that the plaintiff
relied reasonably upon any statements of Larson.

None of

these are shown by even a preponderance of the evidence, let
alone the clear and convincing evidence required by this.
Court in its previous decisions, therefore the trial court
erred in refusing to grant the Motions to Dismiss, for a .
Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
of the, defendant, Larson Ford.
.

-

;>: ...
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,i POINT VI .

., ;.i r . ;

• .• / ,,

, -

.."•>>r„ . IT WAS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE
THIRD PARTY CLAIM OF LARSON AGAINST CONDOR COACH -.
/ CORPORATION. ,
A.

The issue of whether or not the defects of which,

the Christophers complained was a jury question and should have
been submitted to the jury.
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The evidence of plaintiff was incorporated into the
Third Party Claim of Larson, the dealer, over against Condor,
the manufacturer who sold Larson the finished product.

The

plaintiffs1 case as to the mechanical reasons for the problems
which the Christophers had relied upon the testimony of William
Haslam, who testified that the starter solenoid (Exhibit 7-P)
wasmounted on the frame too close to the exhaust manifold of
the engine, causing the starting problem, a problem, if it did
exist, which would have caused Condor many problems (R. 879
and 880). The fuel line for the auxiliary generator was
installed cross-threaded, a matter easily repaired by Haslam,
the cause of the failure of the generator auxiliary motor torun when the tank was less than half full was never actually
determined, but this was one of the items installed by Condor.
Further, the restricted air supply to the motor which Haslam'
testified cut the power was either a problem with the Ford --•
Marketing design or with the way in which Condor placed the
coach body over the chassis.

Condor should have been aware

of the problem in any event, for if it existed, it would
affect the ability of the motor to move the unit over the
road.

Haslam's final opinion was that the drive train was

too small for the load it was to carry, and Haslam had only
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:

tested the motor home without towing another vehicle.

Condor

ordered the chassis, constructed the coach, and installed the
various components within the coach - in short, determined the
size of the motor, transmission and driveline of the chassis;
determined the way that the body was placed on the chassis
and the weight of the body.

The only change affecting these

factors while the motor home was in the possession of Larson
was the replacement of the motor pursuant to the Ford Marketing
warranty.

Neither Haslam nor any other witness claimed that

the motor was any. different in. design or power than the original
motor that was on the chassis when Condor ordered the chassis
from Ford Marketing.

There is no evidence of any other rele-

vant change in the motor home from the time that Condor
manufactured it. until the plaintiffs purchased it, other than
being driven as a demonstrator for between 7000 and 8000 miles.
It is significant that Mr. Haslam never once mentioned the
passage of time, wear and tear, or prior use as being a factor
causing any of the problems which he found.

The problems to

which he testified were defects in design over which Condor had
control.

In the face of such evidence, it is submitted that it

was error for the trial court to rule as it did that the mere
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passage of time and the use of 7000 to 8000 miles was sufficient
to say as a matter of law that the defects complained of. by
plaintiffs did not exist at the time of sale by Condor and
take this issue away from the jury.

To hold a dealer responsible

as a matter of law to the ultimate purchaser for.defects so
obviously the product of poor design and construction on the
manufacturer's part while denying.the dealer recourse as to:
the manufacturer, would be to destroy the effectiveness of
U.C.A. 70A-2-314 as intended by the Official Comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Uniform Laws Annotated, 191,
Comment

::..

;

# 8 :

=-..- ,.

.

-

. -

,
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"Fitness for the ordinary purposes for which
goods of the type are used is a fundamental concept
of the present section and is covered by paragraph
(c) . . . Correspondingly, protection under this
aspect of warranty of the person buying for resale
to the ultimate consumer is equally necessary, and
merchantable goods, must therefore be 'honestly1
resalable in the normal course of business . . ."

The proper disposition of the issue of whether or not
these defects, which were at best latent, existed at the time
of the sale to Larson should have gone to the jury, because
the evidence supports the theory that they were all matters
of design over which Condor had control and if they did exist,
existed at the time of sale from Condor to Larson.
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The only

case in Utah on this point is Chrysler v. Burns,

U __ _f

527 P2d 655 (1974), which held that warranty of fitness for a
particular use was excluded by a contract and that the ultimate
consumer who bought the property, apparently without funds to
pay for it, could not be heard to rescind the contract after
living in the property for two years. The defects complained
of in that case should have been discovered.

In the instant

case, none of these defects were discovered until the*Christophers
apparently discovered them.

Further, the sale by Condor to

Larson, a dealer, contemplated a holding time by Larson as a
dealer and a sale to the ultimate consumer.

It should be \

foreseeable where a manufacturer is selling a $15,000.00 or
more piece of merchandise, that a year or -two passage of time
may be necessary in order to find the ultimate consumer.
•>

B . A n y expressed w a r r a n t y b y C o n d o r applying t o t h e

u l t i m a t e consumer should not b e applied t o the relationship
--v "-•=.*xi -:••. :--i •-,.. ••-.•^••j••;..o^-'i:. •.

b e t w e e n Condor and Larson^
- '

The

•:•.:•

wording of Exhibit 25-DC makes it clear that the"

warranty and the terms thereof were to govern the liability of
Condor directly to the purchaser from an authorized Condor •
dealer, for the period of time of the express warranty, 12
months is computed from the delivery to the purchaser by an
:
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authorized Condor dealer.

A similar warranty was construed in

Redman Industries v. Binky, 49 Ala. App. 595, 274 So2d 621
(1973), under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Court therein
held that such a warranty was not intended by the manufacturer
and the dealer to govern their relationship, but the relationship of the retail purchaser to the manufacturer.
C.

Any disclaimer of warranty between Larson and Condor

Coach Corporation as was provided in Exhibit 25-DC is ineffective.
There is no reference in Exhibit .25-DC that it is intended to apply to the relationship between the manufacturer
and the dealer and under the Binky case, such a disclaimer of
warranty does not apply to the relationship between the
manufacturer and dealer.

••' -

;. j

: .. - ; /-. ..

--_'-

• • .-.

Further, the purported disclaimer was not any document
of sale as between Condor and Larson and was contained in a
loose leaf book in a. drawer in the motor;home.

The printing

of the purported disclaimer was of the same size and., color .:*
as the remainder of the printed document which was captioned,
"Warranty," and does not appear in the wording until the very
last sentence of this exhibit..-.

.

;. ,- .-.

.... •

Such a disclaimer has been held to be ineffective and
not in compliance with Section 70A-2-316(2) which provides as
follows:
-40-

" (2) Subject to subsection (3) , to exclude or
modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any
part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and
to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.
Language to exclude all implied warranties of
fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof.1"
and Section 70A-1-201 (10) provides:
"(10) 'Conspicuous1: A term or clause is
conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as:
NONNEGOTIABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous.
Language in the body of a form is 'conspicuous1 if
it is in larger or other contrasting type or color*
But in a telegram any stated term is 'conspicuous.1
Whether a term or clause is 'conspicuous1 or not is
for decision by the court."
In the case of Boeing Aircraft v. O'Malley, 829 F2d 585, (1964),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construing a similar provision of the Uniform Commercial Code where the seller of a
helicoptor asserted a similar exclusion of the same color and
sized type as the rest of a form, it was ruled as not being
conspicuous.

Similarly in Tiger Motor v. McMurtry, 224 So2d

630 (Ala 1969), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a similar
disclaimer in the owner's manual was not effective, see also
Koellmer v. Chrysler Motor Corp,, 6 Conn. Cir. 478# 276 A2d
807 (1970).
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Thus, the trial court erred in holding as a matter of
law that the defects complained of by plaintiffs did not
exist at the time of sale, that warranty as provided in
Exhibit 25-DC was void because the time of such warranty had
run and that the purported disclaimers of warranty in Exhibit
25-DC were effective as to Larson Ford and conspicuously made
as required by Utah lawe
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the
various rulings of the trial court be reversed as to the claim
of plaintiff and the trial court ordered to grant the Motion
of the defendant, Larson Ford, to enter Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, or in the alternative, that a new trial be granted
the defendant, Larson Ford, on all issues because of the
erroneous dismissal of Condor Coach Corporation from the
lawsuit.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. McCOY
Attorney for Appellant
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